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Securing Today’s Sunflowers: Solar Gardens, the 
Shadows, and Solutions
INTRODUCTION
Members of a small neighborhood, inspired by a desire to leave their 
mark on the world, decide to change the way they live. To achieve this 
goal, they come together and create a collection of solar panels outside of 
the neighborhood; everyone invests money into the project and receives a 
portion of the energy generated. As a result, less energy is being generated 
from harmful practices like coal and gas conversion because this small 
neighborhood has done its part. One day, this group gets an unfortunate 
message in the mail from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
When developing their solar entity, they failed to consider any of the 
business or legal issues; they thought that the small size and harmless 
nature of their enterprise made them immune. They thought that no one 
would have any problems with their organization because they just wanted 
to help the world. Yet, according to the SEC letter, this was a mistake;
because their individual interest in the solar panels is defined as a 
“security,” the entity will need to pay fees for registration and disclosure 
with the SEC. Otherwise the SEC will shut down the project. A single 
letter delivers a devastating blow to the small neighborhood project.
Although this story is only hypothetical, it presents a realistic 
possibility for any solar garden development. Solar gardens are ripe for 
SEC oversight because these investments might be defined as a “security.”1
This designation would be the financial downfall of any similar project 
whose goal is to help consumers that have a lower income access renewable 
energy. Compliance with federal securities registration and disclosure 
requirements is often very expensive, preventing lower income consumers 
from considering this viable alternative to their current, and likely 
environmentally damaging, energy practices.2
This story does not have to be sunset for solar gardens. Federal
securities laws provide exemptions to security regulations that might 
remove the financial burdens of registration and disclosure.3 Although it 
is difficult to “fit” solar gardens exactly into any of the current exemptions, 
solar garden investments can fall into multiple exceptions with slight 
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1. People invest money in alternative renewable energy to reduce the 
environmental damage they cause. See SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
2. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, and 274), https://perma.cc/4JH6-
GGAV.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2015).
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changes brought about through SEC regulation or Congressional 
enactment.4 Although some short term fixes are available, the best solution 
to the issue of overbearing security regulation fees is a long-term answer
through either a revision of the transactional exemptions or an amendment 
to the security exemptions.
To better understand how these exemptions might apply to solar
gardens, Part I of this comment will explain the basic structure of a solar 
garden, the applicable securities regulations, and how solar gardens might 
fit within the regulatory framework. Once solar gardens are placed under 
the metaphorical clouds of securities regulations, Part II will describe why 
this overcast sky could be the downfall of solar gardens. Part III will 
describe the potential cracks where light can get through, namely the 
transactional and security exemptions available, as well as what changes 
will allow solar gardens full access to the market. Finally, this comment
will explain how the best exemption to apply depends on the size of the 
solar garden site.
I. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK
The first part of this section describes solar gardens and why exempting 
them from security regulations is beneficial. Once the benefits of solar 
gardens are laid bare, this section explains the provisions of securities 
regulations in general and how solar gardens may fit inside of this 
regulatory framework. The next part of this section looks at the case law 
surrounding the judicial definition of a security and places the structure of 
a solar garden inside that definition.
A. Tilling the Soil: Why Solar Gardens?
Solar energy generation has increased in popularity due to its
environmental benefits, low maintenance requirements, and predictable 
energy production.5 The Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA), 
collaborating with Green Tech Media (GTM) Research, has predicted that 
the United States solar market is set to grow by 119% in 2016.6 The primary 
source of residential solar energy is rooftop panels.7 Solar gardens provide 
access to solar energy generation for new and previously unconsidered 
consumers. Apartment tenants, house lessees, and condominium owners are 
                                                                                                            
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012).
5. US Solar Market Set to Grow 119% in 2016, Installations to Reach 16 GW,
SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION (Mar. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/G4PX-
LBD5.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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often left out of rooftop installations because they either do not have a roof 
at all, or do not own it. The renter is usually the one paying the energy bill, 
so he may like to partake in renewable energy practices in some way, 
especially if it means lowering his energy costs. Solar gardens fill this void 
because they do not require a roof at all.
Renters are not the only people left out of renewable energy because 
of the traditional systems; in fact, only twenty-five percent of homeowners 
are able to have solar panels on their roofs because the roof is unstable, 
too small, or is not oriented in the right direction to receive sunlight.8
These previously precluded homeowners can now access solar energy 
without having to install a new roof. In general, these renters and 
homeowners with weak roofs are more likely to populate lower income 
brackets than the typical solar panel customer.9 The solar garden is an 
innovative structure that, unlike any current model, provides viable access 
to solar energy generation for lower income customers.10 This access will 
help solar gardens achieve greater penetration into the renewable energy 
market.
Rather than the individual investing in a single rooftop installation or 
with an industrial utility company, the panels in a solar garden are at an off-
site location large enough for groups of investors to participate in the same 
site.11 This location can be the roof of a church,12 school,13 or a piece of 
land.14 This focus on local energy development allows for more awareness 
of environmentally-friendly practices and promotes the local job market.15
For solar gardens to successfully change energy consumption practices, the 
target market must expand beyond neighborhoods with only a handful of 
customers. If solar gardens expand, more potential investors will have 
                                                                                                            
8. See PAUL DENHOLM & ROBERT MARGOLIS, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY 
LAB., NREL/TP-6A0-44073, SUPPLY CURVES FOR ROOFTOP SOLAR PV-
GENERATED ELECTRICITY FOR THE UNITED STATES (2008) at 4, https://perma.cc
/XVW5-4CPX.
9. Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2010-2013: 
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Sept. 2014, at 
1, 4.
10. See JASON COUGHLIN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., Subcontract 
No. AGJ-0-40314-01, A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY SOLAR: UTILITY, PRIVATE, AND 
NON-PROFIT PROJECT DEVELOPMENT (2010) at 20, https://perma.cc/4HZ6-JUXQ.
11. Id.
12. The University Park Community Solar LLC in Maryland uses a local 
church roof. See id.
13. The Solar for Sakai project in Washington uses the roof of a school. See 
id. at 25.
14. The Clean Energy Collective, LLC uses land off site. See id. at 22.
15. 2015 saw nearly 209,000 solar workers and expected to see an increase 
of 14.7% by 2016. See THE SOLAR FOUND., NATIONAL SOLAR JOBS CENSUS 2015
5 (2016), https://perma.cc/VLM8-9Y9D.
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access to them; when more investors are available, individuals can make 
smaller investments in projects that would have originally required larger 
capital investments per person. This in turn provides lower income 
consumers with opportunities in solar garden projects.
B. Plowing the Field: The Structure of a Solar Garden
There are multiple ways to financially structure solar gardens, yet the 
focus of this comment is on the special purpose entity.16 In a special 
purpose entity, individual investors come together to join a business 
enterprise and develop the solar garden.17 These individual investors own 
the solar garden, have all rights to the energy it produces, and any auxiliary 
incentives that are derived from it.18 An individual investor can invest in 
as much of the solar site as he is able, considering his capital and how 
much energy he wants calculated for his financial benefit. The investors 
normally create a solar services agreement with a third-party developer to 
create, maintain, and host the solar garden.19 This host can be the owner 
of the structure containing the panels or another business that is 
sophisticated in reference to solar gardens and their structure.20 The host, 
as owner of the location, is provided a portion of the energy produced by 
the site as a form of payment for its services.21
Once the solar garden is funded and developed and the maintenance
plan is set up, the solar garden entity must determine how to utilize the 
energy. The entity typically creates a power purchase agreement with a 
single utility company that every investor uses.22 As the wholesale 
producer of the energy, the members of the entity are currently unable to 
use the energy in their own homes. The utility company, through the power 
purchase agreement, purchases the energy from the solar garden and, in 
exchange, will deduct costs from the investors’ energy bills in proportion 
to the energy generated from the solar panels they own.23
This deduction to the investor’s energy bill is merely one benefit of 
solar gardens. The utility company also gets to use the energy generated 
from solar panels, a renewable and environmentally friendly resource, 
                                                                                                            
16. Some other potential financial models are the utility-sponsored model and 
the non-profit model. The security regulation issues regarding these are easier to 
address. See COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 15.
17. See id. at 6.
18. See id. at 7.
19. See id. at 5.
20. See id. at 15.
21. See id. at 5.
22. See id.
23. See id.
2017] COMMENT 215
rather than energy from coal or gas. This environmental benefit has its own 
financial aspect as well, called a Renewable Energy Credit (REC).24 RECs 
are typically sold along with the energy to the utility company, which is 
directly creating the environmental benefits that they represent.25 Once the 
site of the solar garden is established, the investors can enjoy the financial 
and environmental benefits of the energy it generates throughout its useful 
life, which can be over twenty-five years.26
Consumers previously unable to participate in solar energy generation 
through traditional means can now access solar energy through these
gardens. Where solar panels once required a foundation of sturdy roofs, 
they now create untapped potential for solar energy and should be 
promoted by federal regulations.
C. Purchasing Pesticides: Security Regulations Explained
Federal security regulations came about because of fraudulent 
activities, which were partly to blame for the Great Depression.27 Congress
first responded to these activities with the enactment of the Securities Act 
of 1933 (“‘33 Act”),28 which requires disclosure by any company making 
a public distribution of securities.29 A company distributes securities in the 
form of ownership in the company in exchange for money. 30 The company 
must “register” the public offering with the SEC, an agency established by 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that is responsible for maintaining 
and overseeing the registration and disclosure of all public offerings.31
These companies are required to disclose information on all significant 
aspects of their business, including management activities, extensive 
financial information, the business’s solvency, and risk factors of the 
specific security.32 The purpose behind the disclosure of this detailed 
information is to give the average investor all of the information needed to
fully assess the merits of the security.33
                                                                                                            
24. See id. at 4.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 49.
27. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 3 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 6th ed. 2009).
28. See id. 
29. See id. at 4.
30. A security is “an instrument of investment in the form of a document (as 
a stock certificate or bond) providing evidence of its ownership.” See MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/DAT7-NM52. 
31. See COX ET AL., supra note 27, at 11.
32. See id. at 4.
33. See id.
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The Act of 1933 and its successors provide multiple remedies to 
investors harmed by violations of securities laws.34 The Act also provides 
antifraud provisions to “prevent material omissions and misrepresentations 
in connection with the offer or sale of securities.”35 These remedies and 
provisions are also present in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.36
Therefore, solar garden entities must carefully consider the applicable 
regulations due to the severe legal and financial impacts they can have on 
solar gardens.
The reason the requirements of securities regulations are so problematic 
for solar gardens is that registration is prohibitively expensive for potential 
investors. The SEC has estimated that the average compliance cost 
associated with conducting an initial public offering is $2.5 million and is 
followed by an ongoing compliance cost for issuers, once public, of $1.5 
million per year.37 Even though solar gardens are typically smaller than the 
average company making an initial public offering, the above costs are still 
unbearable. The target customers of a solar garden, namely renters and 
others who do not have access to rooftop panels, are likely unable to afford 
these excessive costs for registration and disclosure. These expenses will 
force the average customers to stay in their current situation because they 
would prefer the comfort of their utility company to the weeds of new solar 
energy generation.38
II. PLANTING THE SEEDS: ARE SOLAR GARDENS SECURITIES?
Before considering the options to avoid the financial burdens of 
security regulations, the investors must determine whether the SEC will 
consider solar garden investments as securities. There are multiple
definitions of a security provided in the ‘33 Act,39 but the most likely 
definition for a solar garden is an “investment contract.”40 The United 
                                                                                                            
34. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 1:17 (2017).
35. Id.
36. See id. at § 1:18.
37. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,482. 
38. State security regulations, or blue sky laws, are also applicable regarding solar 
gardens. Although the National Securities Markets Improvement Act weakened the 
impact of blue sky laws regarding the imposition of registration and reporting 
requirements, this is still a hurdle that any solar garden entity will need to address. 
Because of the number and variety of blue sky laws, this topic is too broad to fully 
address in this Comment, but the issue of state securities regulations will be 
considered for the merit of certain solutions. See HAZEN, supra note 34, at § 1:15.
39. Including a note, stock, treasury stock, and bond. See 15 U.S.C. § 
78c(a)(10) (2012).
40. See id.
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States Supreme Court provided a concise explanation of an investment 
contract in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.41
A. Howey Explained
In Howey, the United States Supreme Court considered whether 
interests in orange groves purchased specifically for a profit were 
considered “investment contracts.”42 W.J. Howey Co., a Florida company, 
sold approximately 250 acres of orange groves to the public and provided 
a service contract to cultivate and develop the crops for the purchasers.43
The purchasers did nothing to maintain the groves because the servicers 
under the contract had “full and complete possession” of the interest 
acres.44 The interest was not itself a right to any of the fruit, but was only 
a right to a portion of the profits based on the amount of the grove owned.45
The Supreme Court declared that an investment contract is “a contract, 
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common 
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the 
promoter or a third party.”46 The Court went on to find that the investments 
in the orange groves in Howey met the definition of an investment 
contract.47 This definition has been developed through subsequent cases 
and is primarily considered to be a four-part definition: (1) an investment 
of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with an expectation of profits,
and (4) solely from the efforts of a third party.48 A deeper analysis of these 
factors will shed light on the characterization of solar gardens.
Key things to consider prior to a full analysis of these four factors are 
the timing of the analysis and the relationship between the parties. First, 
courts determine the existence of the elements at the time the investor 
purchases the interest.49 Also, as an investment contract, some form of 
contractual relationship is required.50 Contracts with multiple contractual 
relationships and parties can satisfy the test as long as all four elements are
                                                                                                            
41. 328 U.S. 293.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 295.
44. Id. at 296.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 298-99.
47. Id. at 299.
48. See ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE 
SECURITIES LAWS, § 9:65 (2016).
49. See id.
50. Although the Howey definition states a “contract, transaction, or scheme,”
the Supreme Court has not used these words in recent cases. See id.
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satisfied.51 Finally, courts focus on the significant parts of the investment 
when there are security and non-security aspects.52
1. An Investment
Over time, courts have modified the definition for the first element of 
an investment contract.53 Subsequent courts dropped “money” from the 
definition, and it was later added again.54 Clearly, investing money meets 
the first element, but courts have recognized other assets and contributions 
as well.55 Typically, an investment requires “a commitment of assets in 
such a manner as to subject oneself to financial loss.”56
This issue came up in United Housing Foundation v. Forman, where 
the United States Supreme Court considered whether investing money into 
shares as a form of rent payment for an affordable living facility is an 
investment contract.57 The United Housing Foundation sponsored and 
developed Co-op City, a New York housing cooperative that provided decent
low-income housing.58 To have an apartment in Co-op City, a purchaser was 
required to buy eighteen shares of stock for each room desired, at the price of 
$25 per share.59
The Court first stated that the name given to an interest is not relevant 
in deciding whether it is an investment.60 It is unreasonable to believe that 
federal securities laws apply because the instrument is called a “stock.”61
The decision depends on the substance of the investment, or “the economic 
realities of the transaction;”62 in this case, “an investment in a common 
venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from 
the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others,” slightly differs from 
Howey.63 Regarding the economic realities of the Forman facts, the Court 
differentiated between an “investment” and “purchas[ing] a commodity 
for personal consumption.”64 The “investors” were not interested in 
                                                                                                            
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at § 9:66.
54. See United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); S.E.C. v. 
Comcoa Ltd., 855 F. Supp. 1258, 1260 (S.D. Fl. 1994); S.E.C. v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 
389, 397 (2004).
55. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979).
56. See JACOBS, supra note 48, at § 9:66.
57. 421 U.S. 837.
58. Id. at 841. 
59. Id. at 842.
60. Id. at 850.
61. See id. at 851.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 852.
64. Id. at 858.
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financial returns from purchasing shares in the “stock,” but were interested 
in purchasing a place to live at a good price.65 The Court pointed out that 
the motive of purchasing something at a good price “characterizes every 
form of commercial dealing” and is not a financial endeavor requiring
regulation by securities laws.66
This concept of an investment clearly requires a factual analysis of the 
particular investment project to determine if the project meets the first 
required element of an investment contract. The motive behind the parties, 
the “economic realities” of the interest, and the financial benefits actually 
received are all factors to consider. Therefore, individuals pursuing potential 
solar garden projects must carefully consider the structure and benefits of 
the project in order to avoid this first element, and thus avoid regulation as 
a security.
2. In a Common Enterprise
Interpretation of the second element of an investment contract, a 
common enterprise, is split among courts.67 One set of courts recognizes 
“horizontal commonality” as the second element.68 Other courts recognize 
the broader and easier to satisfy definition of “vertical commonality.”69
Horizontal commonality requires pooling investments together and 
sharing profits and losses. The pooling of investments implies that the 
success of the enterprise necessarily leads to the success of the investors.70
Courts are still considering the meaning of sharing in profits and losses as 
well. The Supreme Court in Lavery v. Kearns held that there is no horizontal 
commonality when investors do not share profits, but the promoter’s efforts 
are needed for the individual profits of the investors.71
Vertical commonality is further divided into “broad” and “narrow”
commonality.72 Broad vertical commonality only requires the investments 
being interwoven or dependent on the efforts of other investors or third 
parties.73 Pooling investments is not required and vertical commonality can 
occur with only one investor so long as it meets the dependence requirement.74
The third party simply performing the efforts necessary to produce the profit 
                                                                                                            
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See JACOBS, supra note 48, at § 9:67.
68. These courts include the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits. See id.
69. The Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts support vertical 
commonality. See id.
70. Berman v. Bache, 467 F. Supp. 311, 318-19 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
71. Lavery v. Kearns, 792 F. Supp. 847, 857-58 (D. Me. 1992).
72. See JACOBS, supra note 48, at § 9:67.
73. See id.
74. See id.
220 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VI
is not enough to meet the dependence requirement.75 Narrow commonality 
requires a direct connection between the success and failure of the third 
party and the investor.76 There needs to be a “direct correlation” between 
the success and failure of the promoter and that of the investor.77
3. A Reasonable Expectation of Profit
The third element of Howey’s definition of an investment contract can 
be split into two parts, the first part being “profit.”78 The Supreme Court in 
Forman provided the primary definition of profit by stating that it means 
“either capital appreciation . . . of the initial investment . . . or a participation 
in earnings.”79 Courts considered this the exclusive definition until SEC v. 
Edwards, where the United States Supreme Court ruled that “[t]here is no 
reason to distinguish between promises of fixed returns and promises of 
variable returns.”80 The previous definitions provided in Forman were 
variable in nature, depending on the relative success or failure of the 
investment. The Edwards Court has extended this definition to include fixed 
payments such as periodic payments.81 Therefore, the definition of profits is 
now broad enough to include most financial returns on an investment.
The Supreme Court in Forman also disposed of the idea that a deduction 
in the monthly rent charge applied to mortgage interest is not profit;82
therefore, tax deductions for a tax sharing agreement are not considered 
profits.83
The second part of this element of an investment contract is the 
“reasonable expectation” of profits.84 In Forman, the Court discussed this 
issue under two ideas: the motives of the investors and the speculative 
nature and insubstantiality of the profits.85 The motive of the investors, 
because it resides in the mind of the investor, is a difficult factor to 
consider. For a reasonable expectation of profits to exist, the “investor’s
                                                                                                            
75. See id.
76. See Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978).
77. See id.
78. See JACOBS, supra note 48, at § 9:68.
79. 421 U.S. at 852.
80. 540 U.S. at 394.
81. Id. at 390.
82. 421 U.S. at 855.
83. See JACOBS, supra note 48, at § 9:68. A tax sharing agreement is a 
contract in which a group allocates individual tax liability among themselves in a 
specific arrangement. See Dale Ponikvar & Russel Kestenbaum, Aspects of the 
Consolidated Group in Bankruptcy: Tax Sharing and Tax Sharing Agreements,
58 TAX L. 803, 826 (2005).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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dominant motive is to seek a profit rather than consume an item.”86 Motive 
can be discovered through evidence such as the promoter’s materials and 
testimony of the investor.87 Since reasonableness is required, the testimony 
of the investor should be weighed against that of a reasonable man in his 
position. This means that a reasonable expectation of profits can exist even 
if profits are never actualized.88 With regard to the substantiality of the 
investment, this is an objective analysis that the court can consider 
regardless of the expectations of the parties.89
4. Profits Derived Solely From the Efforts of a Third Party
Although the United States Supreme Court in Howey described the 
fourth element as profits derived solely from the efforts of a third party, 
Forman and other subsequent courts have slightly changed the element to 
include profits derived from the “entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of 
others.”90 Lower courts have delineated from the idea held in Howey that 
the profits must be derived solely from the efforts of others.91 Now courts 
consider whether the efforts made by others are “the undeniably significant 
ones”92 and whether the investor has only “nominal or limited 
responsibilities.”93 The U.S. Supreme Court is still not clear on whether 
this element is required to be “solely” from the efforts of others.94
Whether profits are “solely” from efforts of a third party depends on the 
participation and control of the investors.95 Profits are unlikely to be solely 
from others as the participation and control of the investors increases. A 
factor to consider regarding participation and control is management 
agreements and the investor’s motives behind the agreement.96 Courts have 
agreed that a management agreement will only meet this element if the 
investor was required to reach out to the third party as an economic 
practicality.97 Courts have recognized multiple factors to consider, including: 
the amount of money invested, the special knowledge or skills required to 
manage the investment, the investor’s sophistication, and the investor’s
                                                                                                            
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See S.E.C. v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 
1999).
92. Id. 
93. Steinhardt Group Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 153 (3d Cir. 1997).
94. See JACOBS, supra note 48, at § 9:69.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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access to information.98 Courts should also consider the powers the 
investor retains in the management agreement.99
The actual managerial or entrepreneurial tasks are questions of fact, 
which depend on what the investor reasonably believed he had to provide at 
the time of the purchase.100 Further, the relationship between the investor 
and the third party is important because if the investor has control over the 
third party, then it is possible that this would preclude the investment from 
qualifying as an investment contract.101 Having control over the party, such as 
an employee, performing the managerial tasks is only an extension of the 
investor’s control and efforts.
B. Structuring the Garden to Avoid Being a Security
Avoiding characterization as an investment contract requires avoiding 
one of the four elements described above.102 Solar gardens have the best 
chance of avoiding the “common enterprise” element, the “reasonable 
expectation of profit” element, or the “derived solely from the efforts of 
third parties” element.
1. Making Solar Gardens Uncommon Enterprises
Solar garden investors should first consider where the courts in their 
jurisdiction stand regarding the common enterprise requirement. 
Unfortunately for solar gardens, it seems as though the more inclusive 
definition, vertical commonality, is the more popular stance.103 It is still
possible to structure the solar garden in such a way as to avoid this definition, 
so there are opportunities to avoid regulation here. For the sake of allowing 
all solar gardens to avoid this element, this section will focus on avoiding 
vertical commonality, which will in turn avoid horizontal commonality.
Vertical commonality requires the success or failure of the investor to 
depend on the success or failure of the third party, and it doesn’t consider 
the pooling of money.104 Regarding solar gardens, the success or failure of 
the investor depends on the maintenance company and the utility 
company. If the solar garden investors decide to hire out the maintenance 
of the solar panels, the success of the maintenance company would lead to 
the success of the investors. This success is because maintaining the solar 
                                                                                                            
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See 792 F. Supp. at 860.
103. See JACOBS, supra note 48, at § 9:67.
104. Id.
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garden will allow for more long-term energy generation. This element of 
commonality is interrelated with the managerial efforts requirement for 
how profits are derived. The third party cannot perform the “efforts 
necessary to produce the profit” if the investors want to avoid the 
“common enterprise” element.105 The maintenance team can be successful 
in cleaning the solar panels, but because of some extenuating circumstance, 
such as consistent cloudy weather or the utility company, the panels may 
not get energy, and profits may not accrue. Therefore, there is no direct 
connection between the success of the maintenance team and the success 
of the investors. This allows the investors to avoid the common enterprise 
element, and, thus, classification as an investment contract. Similarly, the 
utility company can be very successful, but have nothing to do with the 
success of the investors. The utility company will sell the same amount of 
energy to their market of consumers; the only thing that would change is 
the source of the energy sold. Therefore, it is very likely for solar gardens 
to avoid the common enterprise element of an investment contract.
2. Avoiding the Reasonable Expectation of Profit
Solar gardens and their investors have a great opportunity to avoid 
security regulations through this element. A key benefit of renewable 
energy generation is to promote and facilitate environmentally friendly 
practices. Conventional forms of energy cause damage to the environment 
by polluting the air with emissions created by the conversion of energy.106
These decreases in emissions and environmental protections are likely the 
primary reason consumers invest in solar energy.107 If structured and 
presented properly, solar garden ventures can avoid regulation by presenting 
this as the dominant motive for investment.
The returns most likely to be considered “profits” are the deductions 
in the investor’s energy bill. This deduction would likely be considered a 
form of “earnings” rather than capital appreciation.108 For solar gardens to 
avoid this element, the best route is through the motive of the investors or 
the nature of the investment as insubstantial or speculative.
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106. The electricity sector produced more greenhouse gases than any other 
sector in 2014, including the industrial sector. Coal combustion accounted for 77 
percent of those greenhouse gases. See Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Sources of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA (last updated Apr. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc
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Unfortunately, since this element is a heavily fact sensitive analysis 
with many ambiguities, there is no sure way to avoid this element without 
avoiding profits altogether. Advertising properly and promoting certain 
practices throughout the arrangement can address the motive of the 
investors. As stated above, promoting environmentally friendly practices 
is a main benefit of solar gardens and is likely the primary benefit for many 
investors. The promoters of the solar garden, through their advertising 
documents, can take the first step in avoiding this element. Having documents 
that downplay the financial benefits and promote the environmental benefits 
would weigh in favor of the environmental benefits as the “dominant 
motive.”109 Further, by promoting other environmentally friendly practices 
aside from the renewable energy, such as recycling and sustainable 
transportation practices, the promoter of the solar garden can show that the 
motive is not profit, but protecting the environment.
Showing that the profits derived from solar gardens are speculative or 
insubstantial will require a more objective analysis. Courts have looked to 
the testimony of the investors and the promotional materials of the issuer 
in determining whether or not the profit is speculative or insubstantial.110
Further, the opinions of the parties seem to have greater weight than the 
analysis of the facts of the investment.111 Therefore, the best way to avoid 
this element is through careful advertising along with a well-rounded 
approach to the environmental benefits that are likely the major goal.
3. Deriving Profits from Somewhere Else
If courts decide that there are profits generated from solar gardens, the 
managerial efforts that lead to these profits are likely the managing of the 
maintenance of the panels and the collection of energy by the utility 
company. The investors will likely hire someone to manage these 
agreements and keep the investors informed regarding the solar garden. 
First, this manager would only be necessary if the solar garden is large. If 
the garden is small enough, the investors could simply manage these 
agreements as a group or select one person to be the voice of the 
investors.112 This would be one way to avoid characterization as a security.
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The long-term goals are to expand access to renewable energy and 
have larger solar gardens. These larger solar gardens will likely need to 
hire out the managerial practices to someone else, or designate a 
sophisticated investor as the manager.113 The first and easiest way for 
larger solar gardens to avoid this element is by allowing the investors to 
maintain control over the maintenance company. If the investors have the 
power to remove the manager at will, veto his decisions, or reserve the right 
to manage on their own, then there would be no investment contract.114
Additionally, the agreement can also avoid this element by providing the 
investors with full access to information and allowing the investors to visit 
the site and offer managerial suggestions on some basis.115
The maintenance process of the solar panels depends on the 
sophistication of the panels themselves.116 If the maintenance process 
simply involves cleaning the panels on a regular basis, this is something 
that does not require specialized skill and could potentially be done by the 
investors themselves.117 If the panels are more sophisticated, such as 
having moving parts, then it is likely that this will require more specialized 
care and managerial supervision. 
III. IF OVERCAST SKIES STILL LOOM
Although investors and promoters can structure solar gardens in a way 
to avoid characterization as a security, it may still be unfeasible for some 
solar gardens to avoid this outcome. With this characterization, solar 
gardens will be enveloped into the folds of full securities regulations.118
The stifling burden of registration and disclosure with the SEC, an 
exorbitantly expensive process,119 will likely block out any potential that 
solar gardens have to expand renewable energy use in the United States.
By requiring solar gardens to register and disclose detailed information 
to the SEC, these regulations are increasing the cost of the investment that 
potential consumers will need to contribute to be able to participate in a solar 
garden. This increase in cost will lead lower income consumers away from 
solar gardens, remaining stagnant in their current, and environmentally 
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harmful, energy practice.120 This will prevent both the expansive 
opportunities lying dormant within the renters and community living 
consumers of the nation and the expansion of awareness of environmentally 
friendly practices. Additionally, the protections afforded to investors of solar 
garden entities through securities regulations are possibly not worth the price. 
The structure of solar gardens is very clear and straightforward, and the 
financial changes are easily predicted once the initial energy output is 
determined.121 The registration and vigorous disclosure efforts would not 
provide any new information to the investors and would not be worth the 
large investment increase. 
This inefficient protection is why securities regulations need to change 
to allow for the benefits that solar gardens would bring to the nation. By 
opening the doors to a solar garden generation, a more efficient and 
effective solar model can enter the market and potentially be the new 
primary source of energy in many places. This change would not bring 
about any serious disturbance to securities regulations and only requires 
slight changes to the exemption provisions in order to allow solar gardens 
to reach their full potential. 
A. Letting the Light Shine Through: How Solar Gardens Blossom
The most appropriate solution for any solar garden project depends on 
the structure of the project. Smaller, community-focused projects will 
require different exemption conditions than larger scale, industrial-level 
projects. For some smaller scale projects, certain transactional exemptions 
under section 4 of the Securities Act of 1933 could allow for release from 
the registration requirements that would prevent consumer access.122
Larger scale projects would likely require a full security exemption under 
Section 3 of the Act.123 The best long-term solution for solar gardens of 
any size to reach as many customers as possible is an exemption that
allows for both the initial purchase and transfer of the security without 
such burdensome registration and disclosure costs. 
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1. Small Scale Solutions for Small Scale Solar Gardens: Transaction 
Exemptions
Transactional exemptions exclude from federal securities regulations 
the initial sale of certain investment interests from the issuer to the 
customer.124 If the purchaser of the interest resells it to another party, then 
that transaction would not be exempt and would trigger full registration 
and disclosure requirements.125 This reselling limitation is the reason only 
smaller local projects would use these exemptions in practice. Regardless, 
the transaction exemptions most likely used by smaller solar garden 
projects are two small issues exemptions: a private placement exemption 
and an intrastate offering exemption.126
In October of 2016, the SEC promulgated new rules and amended 
some rules already in place.127 The SEC has amended Rule 504, the small 
issues exemption, and repealed Rule 505 of Regulation D.128 Further, the 
SEC has amended Rule 147, the intrastate offering exemption, and added 
Rule 147A under Section 3(a)(11) of the Act of ‘33 to expand this 
exemption.129
a. Rule 504: Small Issues Exemption
Under Rule 504, promulgated under Section 3(b) of the Act of ‘33 and 
also as part of Regulation D, the SEC provided a transaction exemption 
for small offerings with an aggregate price of less than $5 million.130 Rule 
504 also requires the offering to be registered with the applicable state 
securities laws. Unfortunately, state regulations are often more stringent 
than federal regulations because they include merit regulation standards 
where the issuer needs to prove the substantive value of the offering to a 
state security administrator.131 While an investment in solar energy 
generation would likely satisfy the merit standards, most states also have 
general solicitation prohibitions, caps on nonaccredited investors, and 
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suitability requirements for sales to nonaccredited investors.132 These 
conditions are more difficult for solar garden projects to address and will 
likely inhibit growth. 
Luckily, the state legislative forum is more approachable than Congress 
by solar garden supporters, so it would be much easier to present to the state 
legislature the benefits that an exemption more sympathetic towards solar 
gardens would provide for their state. Some states have already passed 
regulations that more closely mirror Rule 504 and are less restrictive 
regarding their requirements.133 This route of exemption from securities 
regulations is the most efficient for smaller solar gardens because they 
would be exempt from both federal and state regulations. However, it would 
be a poor long-term solution for full consumer participation because of the 
aggregate offering price limit and would require a great deal of lobbying in 
many state legislatures. An easier route is likely available that would allow 
for both federal and state exemption without the limitations.
b. Section 4(a)(2): The Private Placement Exemption
The private placement exemption under Section 4(a)(2) provides an 
exemption for “transactions by an issuer not involving a public offering.”134
Courts and the SEC have developed multiple factors regarding this vague 
provision.135 These requirements include few offerees and a small offering, 
although the specific amounts are not explained.136 Each offeree should 
also have access to the information that the issuer would disclose if 
required to register with the SEC.137 The offerees must be sophisticated, 
both in business and in the investment offered, in order for the exemption 
to apply to the transaction.138 Finally, the issuer cannot advertise the 
offering through general solicitation.139
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Because of confusion regarding Section 4(a)(2) of the Act, the SEC 
promulgated Rule 506 as a safe harbor for companies.140 Under Regulation 
D, this safe harbor provides clarification and a safe route for businesses to 
ensure access to Section 4(a)(2). First, Rule 506 requires that the offering 
is limited to thirty-five purchasers.141 These purchasers exclude relatives 
of the issuer and accredited investors.142 Since solar gardens are designed 
for natural persons, the pertinent portion of the definition of an accredited 
investor is one “whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that 
person’s spouse, exceeds $1,000,000” or “who had an individual income 
in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years . . . and has a
reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current 
year.”143 These unaccredited investors must be sophisticated regarding the 
financial aspects of investing and specifically, regarding this investment.144
Therefore, the issuer needs to provide some financial information to the 
purchasers, although less than what is fully required under Section 5 of the 
1933 Act.145 Finally, Rule 506 prohibits general solicitation by the issuer or 
any representative.146
Most current solar garden projects would meet the thirty-five-investor 
requirement because of their community-focused nature. Unfortunately, this 
cap on purchasers prevents future economies of scale for solar gardens and 
also causes the project to require a larger investment by each purchaser.147
This consequence of larger individual investments directly contradicts the 
purpose of solar gardens, which is providing environmentally friendly 
energy practices to lower income investors. Thus, this exemption could only 
be a short-term solution for some solar garden projects, and not a long-term 
doorway through federal securities regulations for solar gardens. 
Since small and local solar garden projects can be advertised by word 
of mouth, the general solicitation prohibition would not prevent their 
access to this exemption. This condition, however, would severely limit 
the size of the project and prevent future growth. Only the smallest and 
most locally oriented projects would be successful while meeting this 
condition. 
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The challenging hurdle that solar garden projects would need to 
address is the sophistication of their purchasers. Since the typical customer 
is an average homeowner or renter, it is highly unlikely that they would 
individually meet the sophistication requirements established by Rule 506. 
The only way to satisfy the sophistication requirement is if the unaccredited 
and unsophisticated investors have a purchasing representative who 
evaluates the merits on their behalf.148 A purchasing representative is one 
who is not an affiliate of the issuer, has such knowledge and experience in 
financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and 
risks of the prospective investment, is acknowledged by the purchaser in 
writing, and discloses to the purchaser in writing any material relationship 
between himself and the issuer within the past two years.149 Because he is
a sophisticated business representative, a purchase representative will not 
be cheap. Unfortunately, this once again challenges the purpose of solar 
garden projects by adding another expense that will cause potential lower 
income investors to opt out of solar garden projects.
For this and all of the other transactional exemptions above, the 
limitation on reselling is potentially detrimental because the initial 
purchaser needs to hold the interest for the life of the solar panel, which 
can extend well beyond twenty years, to maintain the exemption.150 If the 
structure of the project involves a utility company collecting the energy 
and deducting it from the customer’s bill, a customer would be limited to 
moving within the coverage of the utility company that has the power 
purchase agreement with the project. If the customer moves outside of the 
utility company’s coverage, he would need to sell the interest to someone 
within the coverage or have an interest in something that is no longer 
providing a benefit. Unless some arrangement can be made with the new 
utility company, the energy collected by his share in the solar garden 
would no longer be deducted from his energy bill.
c. Section 3(a)(11): The Intrastate Offering Exemption
Section 3(a)(11) states that “[a]ny security which is part of an issue 
offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State . . . where 
the issuer of such security is a person resident and doing business within 
or . . . incorporated by and doing business within, such State” is exempt 
from federal securities regulation.151 The intrastate offering exemption, 
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although provided in the section designated as exempt securities,152 is 
considered a transaction exemption under current legislative and judicial 
interpretations.153 This consideration provides for the ability to resell the 
interest under this exemption. This exemption would also be beneficial to 
certain smaller solar gardens because only in-state residents would 
purchase the interest anyway. This is especially true because the utility 
company holding the power purchase agreement will likely be focused in 
a single region, and more specifically within the state that the solar garden 
is located.154 Like the other transaction exemptions, there are some 
conditions that might prove challenging even for local solar gardens.
The SEC has promulgated Rule 147 as a guide to Section 3(a)(11).155
This Rule addresses issues such as the requirement of securities coming to 
rest in a certain state and advertising and offering issues.156 Rule 147 states 
that the requirement that the securities come to rest in a certain state is 
satisfied if resales of the security are limited to residents of the state for 
nine months after the original issuance.157 Further, engaging in general 
advertising, using a third-party internet site to promote the issuance, or 
using its own website or social media to offer securities would not ruin the 
exemption opportunities for the solar garden entity so long as the entity 
implements adequate measures to ensure offers only go to residents.158
These less restrictive measures provided by Rule 147 are helpful for 
solar gardens because they remove some of the primary issues that solar 
gardens would have to circumvent pursuant to Section 3(a)(11). The 
primary issue that the solar garden project must address for this exemption 
is the distribution of the interests. Under Rule 147, the investor in the solar 
panel only needs to maintain the interest in that state for nine months;
afterwards he can sell it to whomever he wants.159 Freedom of transferring 
the security can allow for the full use of the solar panels throughout their 
life without any decrease for the benefits they provide. The issuer of the 
security doesn’t need to worry about the long-term plans of the potential 
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investor and whether the decision to move will have a negative impact on 
the exemption of the security. The intrastate exception has this great
benefit compared to any true transactional exemption found under Section 
4 of the Securities Act. 
The loosened requirements regarding advertising also help solar 
gardens because they allow solar gardens to advertise through technology, 
something previously not allowed by Section 3(a)(11).160 By advertising 
online, the solar garden entity can solicit more potential investors and allow 
for economies of scale through technology. Lower income consumers, in 
turn, will have better access to renewable energy because the economies of 
scale will allow for more, smaller investments.
Unlike the private placement exemption, there are no requirements 
regarding the nature or number of purchasers of the security to meet the 
intrastate offering exemption.161 The purchasers do not need to be 
sophisticated, and there are no requirements about their financial position.
This is more in line with the purpose of solar gardens because it allows for 
smaller investments by lower income individuals, who are the target 
consumers of solar garden sites. 
This exemption, because of Rule 147, does not require much change in 
order to allow for long-term substantial growth in solar garden accessibility. 
Because of the loosened rules provided by Rule 147, the burden for solar 
gardens that meet the intrastate offering exemption are the state regulations, 
which are likely even more stringent than federal regulations.162 It is logical 
to maintain coverage of state security regulations because the purpose of the 
exemption is to remove unnecessary federal oversight from local investment 
practices better protected by local regulations. 
Unlike the small issues exemption under Rule 504, the intrastate 
offering exemption has no maximum aggregate price requirement.163 The 
requirement that all of the investors reside in one state is likely less 
impactful to the size of the solar garden than the maximum aggregate price 
because of the structure of the typical solar garden project. Since a utility 
company normally has a power purchase agreement with the solar garden 
project’s host, the project is already inherently local. The size of the 
project could still be substantial even though it remains in one state. It is 
likely that the aggregate price of a single solar garden could easily exceed 
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one million dollars while still only offering and selling the interests to 
people in a single state. 
2. Parting the Clouds: Amending Transaction Exemptions
Clearly, no transactional exemption, on its own, would be beneficial 
for all solar garden projects. Rule 504164 and the Intrastate Offering 
Exemption165 both expose solar gardens to the full spectrum of applicable 
state security regulations, which are often more stringent than their federal 
counterparts. Rule 506,166 while exempting the security from both federal 
and state regulations, has a cap on nonaccredited investors at thirty-five,
which inhibits the purpose of solar garden projects. 
With small changes, these exemptions could be very beneficial in the 
long run for solar garden projects. If the project is solely in a state that has 
relaxed their securities regulations beneficially for solar gardens, then 
fitting the interest in either Rule 504 or the intrastate offering exemption 
would allow for a very successful venture. Unfortunately, this process 
would be difficult and time consuming because multiple state laws would 
need to be changed to meet solar gardens’ needs. The investors of the first 
project in each state would have to lobby with their state legislature to 
change any security regulations or add exemptions for entities like solar 
gardens. The proposals would require business and legal representatives 
to develop an argument and convince their legislators that the projects 
have merit and deserve to be exempt. Lower income investors would likely 
stay with their current energy system rather than take the financial risks of 
funding a lobbying campaign to change state securities regulations.
An ideal solution must address both state and federal regulations, 
while still being expansive enough to allow for the growth of solar gardens 
to meet the market demands of accessing the unconventional solar 
customers that solar gardens are reaching for. A potential answer for this 
resides in an exemption that already exists: Rule 506. This rule exempts the 
security from both state and federal securities regulations. An amendment 
to allow for more than thirty-five unaccredited purchasers would allow for 
more access to the potential low to middle income consumers because the 
opportunity for more small investments would be available. Unfortunately, 
this rule would also have to be moved because no securities under a 
transactional exemption cannot be resold, which means that the purchasers 
would be stuck with the security. A regulatory amendment achieving this 
goal would be difficult to obtain but is not unfeasible. Rule 504 already 
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doesn’t have a cap on unaccredited purchasers, and securities falling under
the intrastate offering exemption can be resold as long as it is in the same 
state. Thus, these changes to Rule 506 and Section 4(a)(2) would not 
completely undermine the protections to investors.
Solar garden securities already meet the purpose behind not having a 
cap on unaccredited purchasers and on allowing the resale of the security. 
The structure is fairly simple to understand and doesn’t change once it is 
set in place. The energy output of the system is not affected by a third party 
who could potentially defraud the investors. Even then, the maintenance
of the site does not affect the output in any serious way that would require 
stringent and extensive disclosure or registration with the SEC. Due to the 
local nature of the project, reselling to subsequent purchasers would 
necessarily be within the same general area as the original purchaser, and 
the new purchaser likely knows or could easily be able to gather the same 
information as the original purchaser. Therefore, changing Rule 506 to 
meet these new standards would not cause any damage to the protections 
that federal and state securities regulations promote.
3. Adding a Security Exemption: Opening the Gate for Solar 
Gardens
The structure of solar garden projects meets both purposes behind 
security exemptions, and is therefore prone to exemption under this 
alternate route. These exemptions exist for one of two reasons. The first 
purpose for exempting a full security is that regulations are unnecessary 
because the security is already protected by another regulatory scheme 
focused on that industry.167 The second purpose behind a security 
exemption is that the interest is considered less risky, and so the investors 
do not need the same protections.168 For security exemptions found in 
section 3 of the Securities Act, the entire security is exempt from the 
registration provisions of the 1933 Act.169 The initial transaction of the 
security, however, is still covered by the antifraud provisions of the 1933 
and 1934 act.170 Because the entire security is exempt, this allows for the 
security to be resold without losing the exemption.171
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Solar garden interests are currently not covered by any security 
exemptions within the Act of 1933.172 Solar garden promoters would 
therefore need to lobby for a new security exemption. As difficult as this 
sounds, it is a feasible option and is the most beneficial for solar garden 
projects. Because the energy from the solar garden goes to a utility 
company and the company deducts the funds from the owner’s bill, the 
utility company would need to document these financial numbers on their 
disclosures. The investments in the solar garden and the financial activity 
of the gardens are already protected and disclosed on the utility’s financial 
statements. Therefore, solar garden investments meet the first purpose of 
security exemptions. The solar garden investment is also financially 
unambiguous. The consistency and predictability of the solar garden 
structure make disclosures and registration unnecessary because even the 
most unsophisticated consumer can have a decent understanding of the 
process such that the only protections needed are the antifraud provisions 
that are still in effect with a security exemption.
There are also political benefits to having solar gardens recognized as 
a security exemption. Expansion of solar energy generation is clearly 
popular; eighty-nine percent of average US citizens favor expanding the 
use of solar power.173 Providing an amendment that would enable this 
expansion of solar power is not only good for environmental reasons, but 
also for political ones. Thus, Congress would likely be interested in 
legislative strategies for expanding solar power while protecting the 
consumer. 
CONCLUSION
Solar gardens have a lot to offer to the environmental community. 
Through the local and community-focused structure it currently has, the 
solar garden model can spread knowledge of environmentally friendly 
practices and the benefits that renewable energy has on the environment 
and the economy. There are also many benefits that it can have on 
community wellbeing and employment. 
These benefits are only the start of what solar gardens can do for the 
nation and the world. By expanding solar gardens beyond neighborhoods 
                                                                                                            
172. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2012) (Examples of securities currently exempted 
under this section include government securities, bank securities, nonprofit 
securities, short-term notes, and municipal securities).
173. Brian Kennedy, Americans Strongly Favor Expanding Solar Power to 
Help Address Costs and Environmental Concerns, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 
5, 2016), https://perma.cc/Y838-KRGN.
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and school districts, solar gardens can become the new primary form of 
energy production for the nation. This expansion will lead to unprecedented 
environmental improvement. Security regulations currently hold a potent 
key to unlocking solar gardens’ full potential.
Opening securities regulations for solar gardens will allow more 
structural freedom for solar garden entities to access unconventional and 
lower income customers, substantially improving the general awareness 
of renewable energy and providing all people, not just the wealthy, access 
to environmentally friendly practices. Currently, transactional exemptions 
are still a viable option for many solar garden entities because they are 
smaller in size. For solar gardens to reach their full potential, transactional
exemptions need to be changed to give the solar entity broader financial 
activity options. Alternatively, security exemptions could provide this 
broader scope, but require legislative or SEC enactment. In the end, 
amending security regulations is only the first step to a bright future for 
solar regulations.
Philip J. Giorlando
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